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PROTECTING GOVERNMENT SECRETS: A 
COMPARISON OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 
AND THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT 
KATHERINE FEUER* 
Abstract: The practice of leaking confidential government information to mem-
bers of the press is a longstanding American tradition widely condoned as vital to 
government transparency.  Until 2009, prosecutions of leakers were virtually un-
known. Since then, however, there has been an increase in the number of prose-
cutions under the Espionage Act, the federal statute criminalizing unauthorized 
disclosures of government information. This has subsequently led to a corre-
sponding increase in criticism of the law. Although critics contend that the law is 
both overly broad and overly harsh, conventional wisdom holds that it is nowhere 
near as sweeping, nor as severe, as the United Kingdom’s Official Secrets Act. A 
closer comparison reveals that the two laws are not as dissimilar as typically pre-
sumed.  
INTRODUCTION 
Since 2009, the United States has prosecuted six government employees 
and two contractors for disclosing confidential government information to the 
press in violation of the Espionage Act.1 Prior to 2009, only three such prose-
cutions had ever been initiated.2 
In 2009, in an effort to rein in a culture of leaking, the government decid-
ed to fashion a more aggressive strategy for pursuing and punishing those who 
leaked.3 As Dennis Blair, the former Director of National Intelligence, said at 
the time, “[I]t is good to hang an admiral once in a while.”4 
                                                                                                                           
 * Katherine Feuer is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 E.g., David McCraw & Stephen Gikow, The End to an Unspoken Bargain? National Security 
and Leaks in a Post-Pentagon Papers World, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 473, 492 (2013). While 
eight may seem a relatively small number, the severity and high-profile nature of these prosecutions is 
not to be overstated. See id.; Leonard Downie, Jr. & Sara Rafsky, The Obama Administration and the 
Press: Leak Investigations and Surveillance in post-9/11 America, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS 
(Oct. 10, 2013), http://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php, 
archived at https://perma.cc/D4YG-X6Q3?type=source. 
 2 See Downie & Rafsky, supra note 1. 
 3 See Sharon LaFraniere, Math Behind Leak Crackdown: 153 Cases, 4 Years, 0 Indictments, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2013, at A1. Between 2005 and 2009, 153 cases had been reported to the Department 
of Justice, but no indictments had been issued. See id. Soon after, former Director of National Intelli-
gence Dennis Blair and Attorney General Eric Holder adopted a more aggressive approach. See id. 
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Then, in 2010, Wikileaks began its release of an unprecedented number of 
classified documents leaked by Army Private Chelsea Manning.5 Three years 
later, Edward Snowden, the former defense contractor, released another trove of 
government secrets.6 When asked if the harsh treatment of prior leakers influ-
enced him, Snowden responded that the aggressive prosecutions, instead of de-
terring him, actually had the opposite effect, “[O]verly harsh responses to public-
interest whistle-blowing only escalate the scale, scope, and skill involved in fu-
ture disclosures. Citizens with a conscience are not going to ignore wrongdoing 
simply because they’ll be destroyed for it: the conscience forbids it. Instead, 
these draconian responses simply build better whistleblowers.”7 While the gov-
ernment’s aggressive tactics may encourage some leakers, it seems to be deter-
ring others.8 Washington, D.C.-based journalists have reported chilled relations 
with their government contacts.9 
                                                                                                                           
Reasons for the new strategy included pressure from Congress and intelligence agencies, as well as 
technological advances that made identifying leakers easier and faster. See id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: Wikileaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753, 758, 
762 (2012). The most famous disclosure, released in April 2010 and known as the “Collateral Mur-
der” video, was of a 2007 lethal U.S. Army Apache helicopter attack on a group of men in Baghdad, 
Iraq. See id. at 762. 
 6 See, e.g., A Timeline of Edward Snowden’s Life, WASH. POST, http://apps.washingtonpost.
com/g/page/politics/a-timeline-of-edward-snowdens-life/235/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015), archived at 
https://perma.cc/228G-MVUB?type=source. 
 7 See Shamai Leibowitz, Blowback from the White House’s Vindictive War on Whistleblowers, 
GUARDIAN (July 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/05/blowback-white-
house-whistleblowers, archived at https://perma.cc/7QD2-RDYU?type=source. Former Director of Na-
tional Intelligence James Clapper appeared to agree when, in an interview, he stated the following: “We 
will never ever be able to guarantee that there will not be an Edward Snowden or another Chelsea Man-
ning because this is a large enterprise composed of human beings with all their idiosyncrasies.” See Eli 
Lake, Spy Chief James Clapper: We Can’t Stop Another Snowden, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 23, 2014), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/23/spy-chief-we-can-t-stop-another-snowden.html, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/S853-WJLA?type=source. This makes inevitable future mass disclosures of 
confidential government information. See id. In addition, to consider means available to stop or answer 
Wikileaks, U.S. Army Counterintelligence Center commissioned a secret 2008 report, which, ironically, 
Wikileaks obtained and published. See Fenster, supra note 5, at 766–67. The report concluded that the 
only effective response would be to secure classified information and punish leakers, but such a strategy 
would be unlikely to deter government employees who “believe [that it] is their obligation to expose 
alleged wrongdoing within [the Department of Defense] through inappropriate venues.” Id. at 767. 
 8 Compare Leibowitz, supra note 7 (Snowden stating that aggressive prosecution of whistleblow-
ers encourage leakers), with Downie & Rafsky, supra note 1 (report by Washington Post executive 
editor finding that the government’s harsh response has deterred government employees from speak-
ing with the press, and, thus, chilled relations between journalists and their sources). 
 9 See Downie & Rafsky, supra note 1. New York Times national security reporter Scott Shane 
observed: 
I think we have a real problem. Most people are deterred by those leaks prosecutions. 
They’re scared to death. There’s a gray zone between classified and unclassified infor-
mation, and most sources were in that gray zone. Sources are now afraid to enter that 
gray zone. It’s having a deterrent effect. If we consider aggressive press coverage of 
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The inappropriateness of the response to government employees who leak 
confidential information, whether regarded as traitors or whistleblowers, and the 
efficacy of the government’s renewed efforts to stamp them out has reignited a 
national debate between two seemingly irreconcilable values: the government’s 
need for secrecy and the people’s right to know.10 
Of central importance to the discussion of leak prosecution is the Espionage 
Act, the government’s primary tool to fight against leaks.11 The Act criminalizes 
the unauthorized disclosure of any information the government has deemed se-
cret.12 Those charged with violating it face up to ten years of imprisonment per 
count.13 Critics of the Act contend that it is both overly broad and overly harsh.14 
It lumps whistleblowers and spies together and lacks any overarching policy or 
legal principle as to how vigorously it should be applied.15 
Conventional wisdom, on the other hand, maintains that the Espionage 
Act is nowhere near as sweeping, nor as severe, as the United Kingdom’s Offi-
                                                                                                                           
government activities being at the core of American democracy, this tips the balance 
heavily in favor of the government. 
Id. 
 10 See, e.g., McCraw & Gikow, supra note 1, at 473 (referencing First Amendment scholar Alex-
ander Bickel’s famous characterization of the tension as a “disorderly situation”). 
 11 See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Con-
dones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 554 (2013). 
 12 See, e.g., McCraw & Gikow, supra note 1, at 473. See Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–798 
(2012). Of particular relevance for purposes of this Note is Section 793(d)–(e), the provision which 
enables the government to bring criminal charges against government officials and private citizens for 
the unauthorized disclosures of information related to national security. See 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)–(e) 
(2012). 
 13 See 18 U.S.C. § 793(a)–(f) (2012) (“Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
ten years, or both.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive 
Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 393 (1986) (“The espionage 
statutes are incomprehensible if read according to the conventions of legal analysis of text, while 
paying fair attention to legislative history.”); Morton H. Halperin, Criminal Penalties for Disclosing 
Classified Information to the Press in the United States, OPEN SOCIETY FOUND., 2–3 (July 1, 2012) 
http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/Halperin_CriminalPenaltiesforDisclosingClassified
InformationtothePressintheUnitedStates.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/ZD2G-Q4YM?type=pdf; 
Security v Freedom in the United States: Liberty’s Lost Decade, ECONOMIST (Aug. 3, 2013), http://
www.economist.com/news/leaders/21582525-war-terror-haunts-america-still-it-should-recover-some-
its-most-cherished, archived at https://perma.cc/5GUL-TVBY?type=source. 
 15 See, e.g., Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 14, at 393. According to the author, “[T]he problem is 
that the same statutory language that is given such expansive effect in order to fashion a tough law of 
covert espionage is also applicable to government employees participating in the traditional practice 
of leaking national security information in order to shape policy.” Id. at 392–93; Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 219 (2007); see also Pozen, supra note 11, at 587 n.344. “On its face . . . 
the Espionage Act fails to distinguish among different types of leakers or even different parties to the 
leak transaction: it crudely lumps together classic saboteurs with ill-motivated leakers, well-
intentioned whistleblowers, and members of the media.” Id. 
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cial Secrets Act.16 First enacted in 1889, the Official Secrets Act punishes the 
retention and dissemination of certain types of government information, in-
cluding by members of the press.17 Underlying the Official Secrets Act is a 
general understanding that the disclosure of information gleaned in the course 
of government service is dangerous, disloyal, and naïve.18 The general refrain 
in the United States is that such an act is antithetical to First Amendment guar-
antees and the tradition of a free press.19 
A closer examination, however, reveals that the Espionage Act and the 
Official Secrets Act are not as dissimilar as typically presumed.20 In light of 
the debate over government transparency, it is important to consider the extent 
to which the Espionage Act may be used.21 This Note compares the United 
Kingdom’s use of the Official Secrets Act with the United States’ use of the 
Espionage Act in the prosecution of government employees accused of disclos-
ing confidential information. Part I surveys the culture of leaking in the United 
States and Great Britain and provides background information on each coun-
try’s key prosecutions. Part II discusses the enactment and application of both 
laws, including what the government must prove and the available defenses. In 
addition, Part II details common prosecutorial tactics and judicial interpreta-
tion and application of the statutes. Finally, Part III argues that the use of the 
Espionage Act is more akin to the use of the Official Secrets Act than conven-
tional wisdom suggests. 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Balancing and the Unauthorized Disclosure of National Secu-
rity Information: A Response to Mark Fenster’s Disclosure Effects: Wikileaks and Transparency, 97 
IOWA L. REV. BULLETIN 94, 99 (2012), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_97_Papandrea.pdf, 
archived at https://perma.cc/ER85-94VU?type=pdf; Pozen, supra note 11, at 516, 626. 
 17 Pozen, supra note 11, at 626. 
 18 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 14, at 356. 
 19 See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 16, at 99; Pozen, supra note 11, at 626. 
 20 See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 11, at 626. 
 21 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 15, at 221. Vladeck argues that the ambiguous language of the 
Espionage Act means members of the media could be subject to criminal liabilities. See id. For an 
example of the current debate, see Bill Keller, The Leak Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/opinion/keller-the-leak-police.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&, archived 
at https://perma.cc/6C46-7PG7?type=pdf. The article discusses transparency versus government se-
crecy and the process media outlets use when deciding to publish state secrets. See id. For an example 
of the whistleblower-or-traitor debate compare W.W., Whistleblowers and National Security: A Case 
for Clemency for Snowden, ECONOMIST (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracy
inamerica/2014/01/whistleblowers-and-national-security, archived in https://perma.cc/VWY6-NKTQ?
type=source, with E.L., Snowden: The Case for Prosecution: Treachery and Its Consequences, ECON-
OMIST (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/01/snowden-case-
prosecution, archived at https://perma.cc/LX58-WU2W?type=source. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
There is no settled definition of “leak” in academic literature or journalistic 
usage.22 A common working definition of leaking, and the one adopted by this 
Note, is the unauthorized disclosure by a government employee or contractor of 
classified information, or information protected by a duty of non-disclosure, to 
an unauthorized recipient.23 
A. Culture of Leaking in the United States 
In the United States, First Amendment guarantees of free speech and a 
free press are considered essential to a tradition of government accountabil-
ity.24 Although the government is granted broad power to keep secrets, the 
press is given similar latitude to reveal them.25 
This has produced a longstanding culture of leaking.26 Indeed the political 
culture tolerates, if not fully condones, leaks as a necessary part of modern 
democratic governance.27 With no mechanism of parliamentary inquiry oblig-
ing the executive branch to reveal its activities, leaks function as a check on 
government secrecy.28 Furthermore, the executive branch itself often leaks in 
order to advance its agenda, while competing interests rely on counter leaks to 
reveal proverbial skeletons.29 
Max Frankel, former Washington bureau chief of The New York Times, 
asserted, in a 1971 deposition defending the newspaper’s publication of the 
Pentagon Papers, what is still considered the canonical statement on the culture 
of leaks in the United States: 
 It is a cooperative, competitive, antagonistic and arcane relation-
ship [between members of the press and the government]. I have 
learned, over the years, that it mystifies even experienced govern-
ment professionals in many fields, including those with Government 
experience, and including the most astute politicians and attorneys. 
 Without the use of “secrets” . . . there could be no adequate dip-
lomatic, military and political reporting of the kind our people take 
for granted, either abroad or in Washington and there could be no 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Pozen, supra note 11, at 521. 
 23 See, e.g., William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 
57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1461 n.35 (2008). 
 24 See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 325–26 (2005); Papandrea, supra note 16, at 99. 
 25 See, e.g., McCraw & Gikow, supra note 1, at 473. 
 26 See id. 
 27 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 23, at 1461. 
 28 See, e.g., Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 14, at 401. 
 29 See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 11, at 559. 
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mature system of communication between the Government and the 
people.”30 
Leaking classified information occurs so regularly that it is often de-
scribed as a routine method of communicating about government.31 Although 
commentators often speculate that the volume of leaks has grown markedly in 
the past few years, it is worth recalling President Truman’s declaration in 1951 
that, “[N]inety-five percent of our secret information ha[s] been revealed by 
newspapers and slick magazines.”32 
Despite the high-profile cases of Snowden and Manning, both relatively 
low-level employees, the vast majority of leaks come from senior-level offi-
cials.33 As the now-ubiquitous metaphor goes, the state is the only known ves-
sel that leaks from the top.34 Although many executives publicly claim other-
wise, like Reagan who famously stated that he was up to his “keister with these 
leaks,” the selective release of classified information by senior officials to fa-
vored reporters is an entrenched Washington practice.35 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Washington’s Culture of Secrets, Sources and Leaks, Frontline (Feb. 13, 2007), http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/part1/frankel.html, archived at https://perma.cc/DV8B-
NXN6?type=source [hereinafter Frankel Affidavit]; see Pozen, supra note 11, at 530–31. 
 31 Lee, supra note 23, at 1467. For example, an executive branch study published in 1982 found 
leaking to be a “daily occurrence.” See Richard K. Willard, REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL 
GROUP ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 6 (Mar. 31, 1982), available 
at www.fas.org/sgp/library/willard.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/HNP7-J72U?type=pdf. A few 
years later, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence study counted 147 leaks in eight of the na-
tion’s leading newspapers within the first six months of 1986. See Mark Lawrence, Executive Branch 
Leads the Leakers, WASH. POST, July 28, 1987, at A13. In 2005, the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Commission claimed to have identified hundreds of serious press leaks of classified information over 
the past decade. See COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARD-
ING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 381 
(Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/ELD6-86GC?type=pdf.  
 32 See Pozen, supra note 11, at 529. 
 33 See, e.g., McCraw & Gikow, supra note 1, at 492–94; Pozen, supra note 11, at 529, 567–68. 
As Pozen pointed out, “Journalists and government insiders have consistently attested that leaking is 
far more common among those in leadership positions.” Pozen, supra note 11, at 529. As further evi-
dence, according to a survey conducted by the Harvard Kennedy School’s Institute of Politics of cur-
rent and former senior government officials, 42% of respondents indicated they had at least once 
leaked information to the press. See id. at 528. Researchers believed that number to be understated. 
See id. Rather, all indications suggested that leaks “are a routine and generally accepted part of the 
policymaking process.” Id. Anecdotally, President Lyndon Johnson, in 1964, told his assistant that the 
State Department “leaks everything they got . . . I’ve got about as much confidence in them as I have 
in a Soviet spy.” Eric Foner, ‘The Presidential Recordings’: L.B.J.’s Chat Room, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/08/books/review/08FONERL.html?adxnnl=1&pagewanted=
all&adxnnlx=1339183158-lXuFobsTGA4QufkL4mLdLg, archived at https://perma.cc/ZDF9-W4ND?
type=pdf.  
 34 See Lee, supra note 23, at 1468 (quoting President John F. Kennedy). 
 35 See id. at 1470; Micah Zenko, ‘I’ve Had It Up to My Keister’: A Brief History of National Se-
curity Leaks, ATLANTIC (June 11, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/
06/ive-had-it-up-to-my-keister-a-brief-history-of-national-security-leaks/258337/, archived at https://
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President Nixon, for example, while his administration waged a legal battle 
against the publication of the Pentagon Papers, instructed his aides to leak ad-
verse information about Daniel Ellsberg, the government employee responsible 
for the disclosure, to the press: “We have to develop now a program, a program 
for leaking out information. We’re destroying these people in the papers . . . This 
is a game. It’s got to be played in the press.”36 Similarly, during the investigation 
and trial of leaker Scooter Libby, a special counsel inquiry revealed the Bush 
Administration had authorized Libby’s disclosure of Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) affiliate Valerie Plame’s identity to a favored reporter.37 
B. Prosecution of Leakers in the United States: 1917–2009 
Despite the prevalence of leaks, criminal prosecutions are rare.38 Since 
the Espionage Act’s enactment in 1917 and the Obama administration’s deci-
sion to crackdown in 2009, the government brought only three cases against 
government workers for violating the Espionage Act by disclosing confidential 
information to the press.39 The first arose in 1971 when government contractor 
Daniel Ellsberg leaked the government’s secret history of the Vietnam War to 
The New York Times.40 Ultimately, the court dismissed the case against Ells-
berg due to prosecutorial misconduct.41 In the government’s parallel case to 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/YA7S-X9R6?type=source. For a clear description of the flow of secrets from top officials to 
favored reporters, see Max Frankel’s affidavit: 
I know how strange all this must sound. We have been taught, particularly in the past 
generation of spy scares and Cold War, to think of secrets as secrets—varying in their 
“sensitivity” but uniformly essential to the private conduct of diplomatic and military 
affairs and somehow detrimental to the national interest if prematurely disclosed. By 
the standards of official Washington – government and press alike – this is an antiquat-
ed, quaint and romantic view. For practically everything that our Government does, 
plans, thinks, hears and contemplates in the realms of foreign policy is stamped and 
treated as secret – and then unraveled by that same Government, by the Congress and 
by the press in one continuing round of professional and social contacts and cooperative 
and competitive exchanges of information. 
Frankel Affidavit, supra note 30, ¶ 5. 
 36 Lee, supra note 23, at 1468–69. 
 37 See id. at 1469. 
 38 See id. at 1477. In fact the historic indictment rate for leak-law violators is below 0.3%, even if 
the calculation limits the total number of leaks to classified information disclosures that the intelli-
gence community is known to have referred to the Department of Justice or that government officials 
have otherwise documented publicly. See Pozen, supra note 11, at 536. That number, however, may 
actually only be a small fraction of the universe of potentially prosecutable offenses. See id. The actu-
al rate is probably far closer to zero. Id. 
 39 McCraw & Gikow, supra note 1, at 492. The third case, which arose in 2004, involved lobby-
ists, not government employees or contractors, and is therefore beyond the scope of this Note. See 
United States v. Rosen, 557 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 40 See McCraw & Gikow, supra note 1, at 475. 
41 See Martin Arnold, Pentagon Papers Charges Are Dismissed; Judge Bryne Frees Ellsberg and 
Russo, Assails ‘Improper Government Conduct,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1973, at A1, available at 
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obtain a prior restraint against The New York Times, however, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the broad protections afforded to the press when it comes to 
publishing classified information obtained via leaks.42 
The government brought its second case in 1984 when it arrested naval 
intelligence officer Samuel Morrison for allegedly selling secret photographs 
of a Soviet naval base to the British publication Jane’s Defence Weekly.43 He 
was sentenced to two years in prison for violations of the Espionage Act and 
theft of government property.44 
 Scholars often explain the rarity of such cases between 1971 and 2009 as 
an “unspoken bargain of mutual restraint.”45 This tacit agreement involved 
three parties: (1) government officials, who limited leaks to instances when 
secrecy had been abused; (2) the press, who balanced the merits of publication 
against the risks and typically allowed the responsible officials to weigh in; 
and (3) the government, which refrained from prosecuting the leakers or the 
journalists.46 
This bargain did not equate to censorship, however. To the contrary, the 
press still published significant stories based on leaks of classified information, 
such as the CIA’s use of secret prisons, known as “black sites” to interrogate 
suspected terrorists, and the abuses at Abu Ghraib.47 Despite the newsworthi-
ness of the stories, the government did not bring criminal charges against the 
leakers.48 
C. 2009: The Turning Point 
Soon after President Barack Obama entered the White House in 2009, his 
administration faced mounting pressure from U.S. intelligence agencies and 
congressional intelligence committees to stem what they considered to be an 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0511.html#article, archived at https://perma.
cc/GHP8-4HUA?type=source. 
 42 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); McCraw & Gikow, supra note 
1, at 476. 
 43 See United States v. Morrison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1076 (4th Cir. 1987); Lee, supra note 23, at 
1477–78 
 44 See Lee, supra note 23, at 1480.  
 45 See, e.g., McCraw & Gikow, supra note 1, at 473. 
 46 Id.; see also Dean Baquet & Bill Keller, When Do We Publish a Secret?, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 
2006, at A15. 
 47 See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/J5A2-UUMF?type=source; Salon Staff, Introduction: The Abu Ghraib 
Files, SALON (Mar. 14, 2006), http://www.salon.com/2006/03/14/introduction_2/, archived at https://
perma.cc/YTR3-D7R8?type=source. 
 48 See, e.g., Downie & Rafsky, supra note 1; Greg Miller, Fired CIA Officer Likely Won’t Face 
Charges Over Leak, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/apr/26/nation/na-
cia26, archived at https://perma.cc/94SF-8V3E?type=source. 
2015] The Espionage Act and the Official Secrets Act 99 
alarming number of security leaks.49 According to then-Director of National 
Intelligence Dennis Blair, the turning point occurred in June of 2009 when Fox 
News reported that American intelligence learned of North Korea’s plans to 
conduct nuclear tests.50 Blair and Attorney General Eric Holder then fashioned 
a more aggressive approach to facilitate prosecutions and make it clear to leak-
ers that there are consequences for unauthorized disclosures of confidential 
information.51 
It is worth noting that the Obama administration’s decision to crackdown 
did not occur in a vacuum.52 Following the events of 9/11, the government be-
gan exhibiting a growing need to control information as evidenced by the sig-
nificant increase in the amount of information deemed classified.53 In addition, 
technological developments allowed government officials to monitor who was 
accessing specific classified documents, which in turn, made leak investiga-
tions significantly easier than ever before.54 Finally, the Bush administration, 
upon its exit, assigned two open cases to Department of Justice prosecutors.55 
D. The Obama-Era Prosecutions 
1. Shamai Leibowtiz, Translator for the Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI) 
The first prosecution during the Obama administration arose in April 
2009 against Shamai Leibowitz, a Hebrew linguist who translated wiretapped 
conversations among Israeli diplomats under contract for the FBI.56 The gov-
ernment accused Leibowitz of disclosing classified information about Israel to 
a blogger in violation of the Espionage Act.57 The administration never dis-
closed the nature of the information, the identity of the blogger, or its evidence 
against Leibowitz.58 Even upon sentencing, the judge said, “I don’t know what 
was divulged other than some documents, and how it compromised things, I 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See Downie & Rafsky, supra note 1. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 53 See McCraw & Gikow, supra note 1, at 473. 
 54 See Scott Shane & Charlie Savage, Administration Took Accidental Path to Setting Record for 
Leak Cases , N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2012, at A14. Even under the Bush administration, investigations 
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 55 See id. 
 56 Downie & Rafsky, supra note 1. 
 57 See Indictment of Shamai Leibowitz at 1, United States v. Leibowitz, No. AW09CR0632 (D. 
Md. Dec. 4, 2009), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/12/skleibowitz-charge.pdf, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/X559-4APF?type=pdf; Downie & Rafsky, supra note 1. 
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have no idea.”59 Ultimately, after the ordeal left Leibowtiz in financial ruin, he 
accepted the prosecution’s plea deal and served twenty months in prison.60 
2. Thomas Drake, National Security Agency (NSA) Employee 
The second prosecution of the Obama administration, against Thomas 
Drake, was one of the two investigations inherited from the Bush administra-
tion.61 On April 4, 2010, a grand jury indicted Drake on ten felony counts for 
providing information related to NSA spending to The Baltimore Sun in 2006 
and 2007.62 In particular, the information revealed that the NSA had shelved a 
less expensive surveillance program with privacy safeguards in favor of a more 
costly program without such safeguards.63 
Before leaking the information to The Baltimore Sun, Drake, who main-
tained that he was acting in a whistleblower capacity, brought his concerns to 
his superiors in the NSA, and then to a congressional investigator—all to no 
avail.64 The prosecution’s case began to fall apart, however, when his lawyers 
were finally able to reveal that most of the information at issue was not classi-
fied and other officials had already been talking about the same thing.65 Even-
tually, the government dismissed its ten-count felony indictment in exchange 
for Drake’s guilty plea to the misdemeanor crime of misusing the NSA’s com-
puter system.66 Drake received a sentence of one year’s probation and 240 
hours of community service.67 At sentencing, federal Judge Richard Bennett 
commented on the government’s prosecution, calling it “unconscionable” that 
Drake endured “four years of hell” before the indictment was dismissed.68 
Drake was forced to resign from his government post and now works in an 
Apple computer retail store.69 
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 60 See id. (noting that as a result of the prosecution, Leibowitz’s family is now “destitute”). 
 61 Downie & Rafsky, supra note 1. 
 62 See Indictment of Thomas Drake at 1, 8–13, United States v. Drake, No. R0B18CR0181 (D. 
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 63 See Downie & Rafsky, supra note 1. 
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 65 See id. 
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 67 See id. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. Former NSA director General Michael Hayden admitted publicly that he should never 
have been prosecuted under the Espionage Act, but that, “[Drake] should have been fired for unau-
thorized meetings with the press . . . . Prosecutorial overreach was so great that it collapsed under its 
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3. Jeffrey Sterling, CIA Officer 
In the second investigation inherited from the Bush administration, a 
grand jury indicted former CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling on December 22, 2010 
with ten felony counts, including seven counts for violations of the Espionage 
Act and one count for theft of government property.70 Sterling was arrested on 
January 6, 2011.71 The government accused Sterling of leaking information 
about a failed CIA plan to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program to The New York 
Times reporter James Risen.72 The New York Times never published a story 
about it, but the information was believed to be the basis for Risen’s 2006 book 
State of War.73 It was also not the first time the two men had worked together.74 
Beginning in 2002, Risen covered Sterling’s allegations of racial discrimina-
tion when he worked on the CIA’s Iran task force.75 After losing his job, Ster-
ling unsuccessfully sued the CIA for racial discrimination.76 
Since 2008, the Department of Justice had been repeatedly trying to sub-
poena Risen to testify against Sterling on the grounds that Risen was an eye-
witness to Sterling’s alleged criminal conduct.77 This was the first time in an 
Espionage Act case that the government sought to compel the testimony of the 
reporter to whom the allegedly unauthorized disclosures were made.78 
In July 2011, a federal District Court found that Risen could not be com-
pelled to reveal his source on the narrow ground that Risen had a “qualified 
reporter’s privilege” and the government failed to show that its need for the 
testimony outweighed Risen’s need to protect the identity of his sources.79 
The Obama administration appealed the ruling, and in July 2013, a three-
judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s decision.80 A two-to-one majority ruled that the First Amend-
ment did not protect reporters from revealing the identity of their sources.81 
The court justified this holding by stating that, “Risen’s direct, firsthand ac-
count of [Sterling’s] criminal conduct indicted by the grand jury cannot be ob-
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tained by alternative means, as Risen is without dispute the only witness who 
can offer this testimony.”82 
Risen appealed the decision up to the Supreme Court, which denied his pe-
tition for certiorari on June 2, 2014.83 While Risen’s petition was pending, the 
Department of Justice revised its guidelines to make it more difficult to subpoe-
na members of the press.84 Although the Court’s denial technically means Risen 
could be compelled to testify and reveal his source, outgoing Attorney General 
Holder publicly confirmed that the Justice Department will not force Risen to 
take the stand.85  
True to its vow, the Department of Justice did not call Risen to the stand 
when Sterling’s trial resumed on January 14, 2015.86 Consequently, the gov-
                                                                                                                           
 82 United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 509 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Risen v. 
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ities. The policy is not intended to extend special protections to members of the news 
media who are the focus of criminal investigations for conduct not based on, or within 
the scope of, ordinary newsgathering activities. 
See id. § 50.10(a)(1). 
 85 Josh Gerstein, Holder: No Jail for Risen, POLITICO (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.politico.com/
blogs/under-the-radar/2014/09/holder-no-jail-for-risen-194905.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
CJ4D-PEUW?type=source. 
86 See United States’ Response to the Court’s Order Regarding the Testimony of James Risen 1–
2, United States v. Sterling, No. 1:10cr485 (LMB) (E.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2014), available at http://fas.
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WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/trial-opens-for-ex-cia-
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ernment relied on circumstantial evidence, including phone records showing 
Risen and Sterling in frequent contact, to argue that Sterling not only was the 
only person with access to the leaked information but also was able and moti-
vated to leak it.87 The prosecution’s case convinced the jury and on January 26, 
the jury convicted Sterling on nine felony counts.88 His sentencing is currently 
scheduled for April 24, 2015.89 
4. Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, State Department Contract Analyst 
The Obama administration issued its fourth felony indictment on August 
19, 2010.90 The government accused Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, a State Depart-
ment contract analyst, of disclosing classified intelligence information about 
North Korea, specifically the country’s plans to escalate its nuclear program 
and conduct more nuclear testing, to Fox News’ Chief Washington Corre-
spondent James Rosen.91 Kim faced one count of violating the Espionage Act 
and another of making a false statement for allegedly denying to FBI agents 
any contact with Rosen.92 He eventually agreed to plead guilty and was sen-
tenced to thirteen months in prison.93 
Kim’s case became particularly noteworthy when it was revealed in the 
spring of 2013 that the Department of Justice, in its investigation of Kim, had 
secretly subpoenaed Rosen’s emails.94 In its application for a search warrant, 
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the government asserted that it had cause to believe that Rosen was in violation 
of the Espionage Act as either a co-conspirator with Kim or an aider and abet-
tor.95 
5. Chelsea Manning, U.S. Army Private 
In May of 2010, the military arrested Chelsea Manning, then known as 
Bradley Manning, in connection with the most voluminous leak of classified 
documents in U.S. history.96 While serving as an Army intelligence analyst in 
Baghdad, Manning downloaded more than 250,000 U.S. State Department ca-
bles, 500,000 Army incident reports from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as 
well as dossiers on terrorist suspects detained in Guantanamo Bay and the in-
famous “Collateral Murder” video of U.S. soldiers in a helicopter killing Iraqi 
civilians.97 
In July of that year, Manning was transferred to the Marine Corps brig in 
Quantico, Virginia where he was held in maximum custody.98 Manning re-
mained in Quantico, in solitary confinement, for more than eight months.99 Dur-
ing that time, military personnel, citing the need for precautionary measures, 
stripped Manning of his clothes each night.100 In the mornings, Manning was 
then required to stand naked outside his cell during inspection.101 
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The military eventually charged Manning with twenty-two offenses, in-
cluding eight counts of violating the Espionage Act.102 Manning admitted to 
disclosing the classified information to Wikileaks and pled guilty to ten of the 
charges, including all of the Espionage Act counts.103 He pled not guilty to the 
remaining twelve.104 
Despite Manning’s guilty plea, the military decided to continue pursuing 
the prosecution and added additional charges, including aiding the enemy, 
which carries a sentence of life imprisonment.105 A military judge found Man-
ning guilty of all charges except for the most serious offense of aiding the en-
emy, and sentenced him to thirty-five years in prison.106 The judge also found 
Manning subject to excessively harsh treatment in military detention, for 
which he received a symbolic 112-day reduction in his sentence.107 
6. John Kiriakou, CIA Officer 
John Kiriakou was the first former government official to confirm that al-
Qaeda suspects had been subject to waterboarding.108 On April 5, 2012, a 
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grand jury indicted Kiriakou on five felony counts, including three counts of 
violating the Espionage Act, for disclosing classified information, including 
the names of two CIA agents, to freelance journalist Matthew Cole and The 
New York Times reporter Scott Shane.109 
In March of 2002, Kiriakou led the team that located and captured senior 
al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah.110 Then, in 2007, nearly three years after 
retiring from the CIA, Kiriakou confirmed that Zubaydah was waterboarded 
during his interrogation in an interview with ABC News.111 Kiriakou told ABC 
that while he believed waterboarding constituted torture and should not be 
used again, the CIA was justified for using it in an effort to prevent further at-
tacks.112 
On October 22, 2012, Kiriakou agreed to plead guilty to violating the Intel-
ligence Identities Protection Act for disclosing the covert agent’s name to Cole.113 
The government, in exchange, dismissed the other charges, including the three 
counts under the Espionage Act.114 Kiriakou was then sentenced to thirty months 
in prison.115 Significantly, he was the first CIA officer to serve prison time for 
revealing classified information to a journalist.116 
7. Donald Sachtleben, Former FBI Bomb Technician 
In September of 2013, the government charged Sachtleben with multiple 
counts of violating the Espionage Act by leaking classified information to the 
Associated Press (AP) about a foiled bomb plot in Yemen.117 His case became 
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particularly noteworthy in terms of both the significance of the leak and the 
government’s investigatory tactics.118 
On May 7, 2012, the AP published a story about a successful intelligence 
operation that disrupted a plot by a Yemen-based al-Qaeda offshoot to use a 
suicide bomber, wearing a special underwear bomb that could evade airport 
security, to destroy a U.S.-bound airliner.119 The would-be suicide bomber, 
however, was a double agent, and the government was able to obtain the 
bomb.120 
The story set off an aggressive investigation by the Department of Jus-
tice.121 Internally, employees of all sixteen intelligence agencies were instruct-
ed to establish “Insider Threat Programs” in order to more effectively prevent 
leaks.122 These programs included measures such as routine polygraph exami-
nations; a policy of pursuing unauthorized disclosures of all confidential in-
formation, not just classified information; the imposition of pursuit of any un-
authorized disclosure, not just disclosures of classified information; and penal-
ties for employees who fail to report suspicious behavior.123 
In response to the story, the government secretly subpoenaed and seized 
all records for twenty AP phone lines for April and May of 2012.124 Seized 
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records included calls made by individual reporters on their personal lines, as 
well as calls to the New York, Washington, and Hartford, Connecticut bureaus 
and calls to the AP’s main line in the press gallery of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives.125 In May of 2013, the government admitted that after interviewing 
more than 550 employees, it had been unable to solve the case.126 It was not 
until the seizure of the AP’s records that investigators were able to identify 
Sachtleben.127 
On September 23, 2013, Sachtleben agreed to plead guilty to the unauthor-
ized disclosures in violation of the Espionage Act.128 He was sentenced to forty-
three months, the longest ever imposed by a federal civilian court for a leak-
related offense.129 In a statement accompanying the plea bargain announcement, 
one of the prosecuting attorneys declared, “This prosecution demonstrates our 
deep resolve to hold accountable anyone who would violate their solemn duty to 
protect our nation’s secrets and to prevent future, potentially devastating leaks by 
those who would wantonly ignore their obligations to safeguard classified in-
formation.”130 
8. Edward Snowden, Booz Allen Hamilton Consultant for the NSA 
In the spring of 2013, Snowden provided three journalists with troves of 
top-secret documents from the NSA, where he worked as a contractor.131 On 
June 5, 2013, The Guardian broke the news that the NSA obtained a secret 
court order forcing Verizon to turn over millions of Americans’ phone rec-
ords.132 Dozens of revelations followed, exposing an expansive global surveil-
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 126 See, e.g., Savage, Sachtleben to Plead Guilty, supra note 119. 
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case . . . only after toll records for phone numbers related to the reporter were obtained through a 
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tice Sachtleben Press Release, supra note 117. 
 128 See Dep’t of Justice Sachtleben Press Release, supra note 117. 
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pornography case under investigation at the same time. See id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See, e.g., Barton Gellman, Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations, Says His Mis-
sion’s Accomplished, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
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 132 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, 
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-
court-order, archived at https://perma.cc/425L-XSK6?type=source. The Guardian obtained a copy of 
the secret court order and published it online. See Verizon Forced to Hand Over Telephone Data—
Full Court Ruling, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/
jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order, archived at https://perma.cc/NZ7E-FVPB?type=source. 
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lance system, which also included the collection of digital information from 
Internet firms such as Google, Apple, and Microsoft.133 
On June 14, 2013, five days after Snowden identified himself as the 
source of the leaks, the United States filed three felony charges against him, 
including two espionage ones.134 Snowden, who was in Hong Kong when the 
disclosures were first published, fled to Moscow, where he has been granted 
temporary asylum and is still out of the United States’ reach.135 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See, e.g., Kennedy Elliot & Terri Rupar, Six Months of Revelations on NSA, WASH. POST 
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https://perma.cc/73NS-7MGA?type=source. Snowden also revealed that British intelligence agency 
General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) aided the NSA in its collection efforts. See, e.g., 
Nick Hopkins, UK Gathering Secret Intelligence via Covert NSA Operation, GUARDIAN (June 7, 
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/07/uk-gathering-secret-intelligence-nsa-
prism, archived at https://perma.cc/QQ9Q-LYK6?type=source. 
 134 See Criminal Complaint of Edward Snowden at 1, United States v. Snowden, No. 1:13 CR 265 
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U.S.C. § 641 (2012). Snowden decided to publicly identify himself on June 9, 2013; in a video inter-
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See Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the NSA Files—Timeline, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-nsa-files-timeline, archived at https://
perma.cc/NA6X-ZN83?type=source. 
 135 See, e.g., Gidda, supra note 134. When Snowden’s temporary asylum expired on August 1, 
2014, the Russian government granted Snowden a three-year residency permit, which allows him to 
travel abroad for short periods of time. See Alec Luhn & Mark Tran, Edward Snowden Given Permis-
sion to Stay in Russia for Three More Years, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/aug/07/edward-snowden-permission-stay-in-russia-three-years, archived at https://perma.
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Snowden’s disclosures about the NSA have ignited an international de-
bate over privacy and security.136 Within the United States, federal judges is-
sued conflicting rulings as to the surveillance program’s constitutionality.137 
Subsequently, President Obama issued a proposal to end the bulk collection of 
data and called on Congress to implement it.138 
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 137 Compare Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0881(RJL), 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) 
(finding the surveillance program likely violates the Fourth Amendment), with American Civil Liber-
ties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 734 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (finding the surveillance program 
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program infringes on “that degree of privacy” that the Founders enshrined in the Fourth 
Amendment. Indeed, I have little doubt that the author of our Constitution, James Mad-
ison, who cautioned us to beware “the abridgement of freedom of the people by gradual 
and silent encroachments by those in power,” would be aghast. 
Id. at *24. Ten days after Judge Leon issued his opinion, Judge Pauley found the surveillance program 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See 959 F.Supp.2d at 734. In his opinion, Pauley showed 
great respect for the government’s surveillance program: 
No doubt, the bulk telephony metadata collection program vacuums up information 
about virtually every telephone call to, from, or within the United States. That is by de-
sign, as it allows the NSA to detect relationships so attenuated and ephemeral they 
would otherwise escape notice. As the September 11th attacks demonstrate, the cost of 
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tralized and plot international terrorist attacks remotely. The bulk telephony metadata 
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See id. at 757. 
 138 See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The Admin-
istration’s Proposal for Ending the Section 215 Bulk Telephony Metadata Program (Mar. 27, 2014), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/27/fact-sheet-administration-s-
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E. Leaking in the United Kingdom 
Historically, the United Kingdom embraced a stronger culture of secrecy 
than the United States.139 The general notion is that only Parliament needs to 
be informed of what the British government is doing, particularly when it 
comes to national security.140 In this vein, a government employee’s freedom 
of speech is considered dangerous and naïve.141 
While there is a strong tradition of investigative journalism, the press is 
not considered essential to government accountability.142 Indeed, the govern-
ment is often able to protect its secrets not through a formal judicial process 
but rather through an informal culture of self-censorship.143 A notable example 
of this informal culture is the Defense Advisory Notice (DA-Notice) Sys-
tem.144 Through this system, a government committee issues standing orders to 
the media not to publish stories discussing five categories of sensitive infor-
mation, which include military operations, plans, and capabilities.145 The 
committee also periodically issues guidance on how the press should handle 
specific matters.146 Although the DA-Notice System is voluntary, the press 
generally complies with it.147 
In the United Kingdom, constitutional authority for freedom of expression 
stems from Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, which is incorporated into U.K. law via Section 
12 of the Human Rights Act.148 This authority provides for freedom of expres-
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NEWS (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14572768, archived at https://perma.
cc/3UC8-NHH7?type=source. 
 145 See id. 
 146 See id. 
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Act in 1998, which incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. See Terry 
Kirby, The Human Rights Act, 10 Years On, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/
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sion for citizens generally, but makes no special carve out for the press.149 The 
Act, however, is subject to numerous exceptions.150 
Moreover, the press does not enjoy broad protection in the publication of 
leaked classified documents or matters related to national security, among other 
things.151 In 2004, for example, when a memo detailing a possible U.S. bombing 
of broadcaster Al Jazeera, then-Attorney General of the United Kingdom warned 
British newspapers that they could be subject to prosecution under the Official 
Secrets Act if they published the contents of the memo.152 In a similar vein, the 
United Kingdom places fewer restrictions than the United States does on the use 
of prior restraint.153 
Finally, the United Kingdom relies on the Parliamentary system of in-
quiry, rather than an independent press, to ensure government accountability.154 
Members of Parliament are charged with holding government ministers ac-
countable for matters deemed of public concern.155 
F. Prosecutions in the United Kingdom 
Government employees who disclose confidential government infor-
mation to the press are prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act, which crimi-
                                                                                                                           
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without inference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from 
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territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
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 155 See id. 
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nalizes certain breaches of official trust.156 Originally enacted in 1889, the Act 
has undergone several revisions, most recently in 1989.157 Since then, the gov-
ernment has prosecuted twelve individuals under the current version for leak-
related offenses.158 This is a marked decrease from the more than thirty prose-
cutions in the decade preceding the 1989 version.159 Of the twelve prosecu-
tions since 1989, ten were of current or former government employees or gov-
ernment contractors, one served as a staff member for a Member of Parliament, 
and one was a freelance journalist whose case was dropped prior to trial.160 
G. Prosecutions Against Government Employees 
1. Prison Sentences in Four Cases 
The first prosecution to result in jail time came in 1997 against David 
Shayler, a former Security Service (MI5) officer.161 The prosecution charged 
Shayler with three counts of violating the Official Secrets Act for passing twen-
ty-eight classified documents to the Mail on Sunday.162 According to Shayler, 
the MI5 was incompetent and engaging in unlawful telephone taps.163 The pros-
ecution maintained that Shayler’s disclosures put agents’ lives at risk and sought 
a sentence of six years in prison.164 Shayler was jailed for six months.165 
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The next two prosecutions to result in prison sentences arose in May 2007 
and involved David Keogh, a civil servant in the Ministry of Defense, and Leo 
O’Connor, a researcher for a Member of Parliament.166 Keogh received a se-
cret memo written by then-Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs.167 Although its contents were never made public, it is known to have 
included information about a meeting between Blair and President George 
Bush on the situation in Iraq and included Blair’s efforts to persuade Bush not 
to bomb Al Jazeera in Qatar.168 Keogh claimed he felt morally obliged to re-
veal the memo to the public and so passed it along to his friend O’Connor.169 
O’Connor, in turn, slipped it into a stack of the Member of Parliament’s pa-
pers, who, when he found it, called the police.170 Ultimately, Keogh was sen-
tenced to six months in jail and ordered to pay £5,000 in costs to the prosecu-
tion, and O’Connor received a three-month jail sentence.171 
Thomas Lund-Lack, a Scotland Yard employee, is the most recent gov-
ernment employee to be jailed for leaking secret information.172 Lund-Lack 
leaked a report from the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre about a planned al-
Qaeda attack on the West to a Sunday Times journalist.173 In July of 2007, 
Lund-Lack pled guilty and was sentenced to eight months in prison.174 
2. Charges Dropped in Two Cases 
In November 2003, the government brought charges against Katharine 
Gun, a translator for General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).175 Gun 
leaked to the Observer an email from the NSA asking for British assistance in 
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spying on several United Nations Security Council members who were consid-
ered swing votes on the issue of approving a resolution to send U.S. troops into 
Iraq.176 On February 25, 2004, the trial’s opening day, the prosecution dropped 
the charges without explanation.177 
In September 2007, Derek Pasquill, a civil servant in the Foreign Office, 
was charged with six counts of violating the Official Secrets Act for passing 
secret information to the Observer and New Statesman.178 The leaked docu-
ments pertained to the U.S. government’s practice of extraordinary rendition 
and the U.K. government’s policy toward various Muslim groups.179 On Janu-
ary 9, 2008, however, the case was dropped, when senior officials within the 
Foreign Office admitted that the leak caused no harm to national security or 
international relations and had actually been helpful in starting a constructive 
debate.180 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Espionage Act 
Under current U.S. law, no single criminal statute prohibits a government 
employee from disclosing classified information as a general matter.181 In-
stead, there is a patchwork of statutes that criminalize the disclosure of certain 
types of information.182 
The most commonly applied statute is the Espionage Act, which applies to 
national defense information.183 The Act was first passed in 1917, in response to 
the United States’ entry into World War I and the severing of diplomatic relations 
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with Germany, and it has remained largely unchanged since.184 Congress’s ob-
jective in constructing such a law was to stop the threat of subversion, sabotage, 
and interference with the reinstatement of the draft.185 
President Woodrow Wilson pushed for broad executive control over all 
information relating to military interests, and his proposal, which Congress, 
under mounting pressure from newspapers eventually refused to adopt, would 
have given the President authority to restrict all public discussion, including 
media coverage, of issues relating to the war.186 Moreover, Congress refused to 
give the President blanket authority to punish any disclosure of government 
secrets.187 
The provisions most relevant to government employee leaks of classified 
information are Sections 793(d) and (e).188 These provisions, which apply both 
to those with authorization to possess the information and those without it, 
make it a crime for a person to transmit documents or information “relating to 
the national defense” to someone “not entitled to receive it” with intent or rea-
son to believe that the information will be used against the United States or to 
the benefit of a foreign nation.189 The penalty on conviction includes fines and 
a maximum of ten years imprisonment per count.190 
It is worth pointing out that these provisions simultaneously cover all 
people and all forms of disclosure.191 No distinction is made among spies, 
government employees, members of the press, and the public.192 There is also 
no distinction between leaks to the press that may have legitimate social value 
and leaks to foreign states that may pose a clear and present danger.193 
1. Elements of the Crime 
Courts have held that the statute requires the government to prove four el-
ements:  
                                                                                                                           
 184 Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense 
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 940 (1973). 
 185 See, e.g., David Greenberg, The Hidden History of the Espionage Act, SLATE (Dec. 27, 2010), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history_lesson/2010/12/the_hidden_history_of_
the_espionage_act.html, archived at https://perma.cc/Q33N-B6GK?type=source. 
 186 See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 184, at 940, 964–65. 
 187 See id. at 941. Over the years, Congress has repeatedly refused to pass such a blanket prohibi-
tion on the disclosure of classified information regardless of its content, its potential harm to national 
security, or the intent of the leaker. See Papandrea, supra note 16, at 99. 
 188 Ballou & McSlarrow, supra note 181, at 806. 
 189 See 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)–(e) (2012). Subsection (d) applies to those in lawful possession of the 
information and (e) applies to those who possess the information unlawfully. See id. 
 190 See 18 U.S.C. § 793(a)–(f) (2012). 
191 See, e.g., Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 14, at 407. 
192 See id. 
 193 See id. 
2015] The Espionage Act and the Official Secrets Act 117 
(1) the defendant lawfully or unlawfully had possession of, access 
to, or control over, or was entrusted with (2) information relating to 
the national defense that (3) the defendant reasonably believed could 
be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage of a for-
eign nation and (4) that the defendant willfully communicated, de-
livered, or transmitted such information to a person not entitled to 
receive it.194 
The second element’s requirement that information relate to the national 
defense has weathered and withstood repeated vagueness challenges.195 As the 
Supreme Court reasoned, “[T]he term ‘national defense’ has ‘a well under-
stood connotation.’”196 The Court went on to explain further that “national de-
fense” is a “generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and 
naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness.”197 
Whether information is related to the national defense is a question of 
fact.198 It does not have to be classified, but as a preliminary matter, the govern-
ment must show that it has taken steps to maintain its secrecy.199 The general test 
courts apply, and which they have found sufficiently narrows the term “related to 
the national defense” as to make it constitutional, requires the government to 
show that the disclosure “would be potentially damaging to the United States or 
might be useful to the enemy of the United States.”200 In practice, neither “po-
tentially damaging” nor “useful to the enemy” have proven to be especially de-
manding standards, particularly when classified information is involved.201 Be-
cause information is classified according to the anticipated degree of harm its 
revelation would cause, courts have held that the fact of its classification gener-
ally proves its relation to the national defense.202 
The third element, that the defendant should have reasonably known the 
disclosure could potentially injure the United States or be of use to a foreign 
state, is typically met if the information is classified.203 For example, in United 
States v. Kim, Jin-Woo Kim, who was accused of leaking information from a 
report marked “TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFOR-
MATION” to the media, tried to argue that not all information contained with-
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in a classified report is actually classified and what he disclosed was not actu-
ally classified.204 Kim further argued that because the practice of leaking has 
become so commonplace, he could not reasonably have known his disclosure 
was unlawful.205 The court rejected both lines of reasoning.206 The court found 
the latter unpersuasive because the document itself was marked “top secret,” 
and further held that simply because leaking was commonplace, the rarity of 
prosecutions was not due to vagueness in the text but rather to general investi-
gatory challenges.207 In rejecting the former argument, the court ruled that the 
Espionage Act was not limited strictly to classified information and, as a gov-
ernment employee, Kim had expressly waived his right to disclose any nation-
al security information obtained in the course of his employment.208 
The fourth and final element is that a defendant willfully communicated the 
information to a person not entitled to receive it.209 In order to establish a willful 
violation, the government must prove that the defendant “acted with knowledge 
that his conduct was unlawful.”210 Courts have found this element satisfied when 
the information disclosed has been classified, as the classification system itself 
stipulates who may and may not access specific information.211 Indeed, courts 
have added their own gloss and determined that the statutory language actually 
incorporates the executive branch’s classification regulations.212 
2. Defenses and Mitigating Circumstances 
Courts have rejected a defense of misclassification on the grounds that in-
formation does not necessarily have to be classified in order to fall within the 
purview of the Espionage Act.213 Specifically, courts have held that a govern-
ment’s classification decision is inadmissible hearsay as to whether an unau-
thorized disclosure could potentially injure the United States.214 
Second, courts have found that evidence of a defendant’s patriotism is ir-
relevant to sustain a conviction under Section 793(d) or (e).215 In United States 
v. Morison, the defendant argued that his desire to publicly expose government 
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misconduct was relevant to a showing of willfulness because willfulness re-
quired evidence that he intentionally disclosed the information in an effort to 
damage the national defense.216 In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the 
court explained that a showing of willfulness only requires that the defendant 
knew that he was doing something prohibited by law.217 
Third, and finally, courts have rejected the contention that the leak must 
cause actual harm to the United States before a defendant can be found 
guilty.218 Furthermore, the courts have refused to distinguish between infor-
mation leaked to an ally and information leaked to an enemy state.219 All the 
government must prove is that the defendant intended the information be used 
to injure the United States or to the advantage of a foreign state.220 
B. Other Statutory and Constitutional Protections in the United States 
1. The First Amendment 
The Supreme Court has never expressly addressed whether the First 
Amendment protects government employees or contractors who leak national 
security information to the press, although related cases suggest it does not.221 
In its most recent decision, Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court adopted the rule that 
the First Amendment does not protect public employee speech “that owes its 
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.”222 Some com-
mentators read Garcetti broadly to mean that the First Amendment provides no 
protection for government employees who leak national security infor-
mation.223 As a practical matter, in all cases involving government employees 
leaking to the press thus far, no court has found that the First Amendment has 
provided any measure of protection to the defendant.224 Moreover, Garcetti 
shows the Court’s inclination to force leakers to rely on statutory, rather than 
constitutional protections, even when they engage in whistleblowing.225 
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C. Whistleblower Protections in the United States 
Two whistleblower statutes potentially apply to federal employee leaks of 
national security-related information.226 One is the Whistleblower Protection 
Act (WPA), which protects the public disclosure of a “violation of any law, 
rule, or regulation” if “such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and 
if such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept 
secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.”227 
Key to invoking whistleblower protection under the WPA is that the disclosure 
itself must not be illegal.228 It would not, therefore, protect the disclosure of 
classified or otherwise secret national security information, which the Espio-
nage Act prohibits.229 Even without the Espionage Act, the WPA does not pro-
tect public disclosure of national security information classified under an ex-
ecutive order.230 The WPA does shield non-public disclosures federal employ-
ees make to the appropriate inspector general or special counsel.231 
Until recently, however, the WPA did not apply to security agencies.232 In 
October 2012, President Obama issued a Presidential Policy Directive that ex-
tends WPA protections to national security and intelligence employees.233 The 
Directive only applies, though, to information relating to “waste, fraud and 
abuse”—not national security.234 
The second potentially applicable statute is the Intelligence Community 
Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA), which Congress enacted in 1998.235 
The ICWPA protects employees of four agencies, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnais-
sance Office, and the NSA, who report matters of “urgent concern” to either 
Congress or the Inspector General of the Department of Defense.236 It is worth 
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noting, however, that even when Congress is briefed on classified, and even 
potentially unlawful, government programs, it is not always legally entitled to 
act on that information publicly.237 In sum, there are two possible options for 
federal employees who want to blow the whistle on government misconduct by 
disclosing confidential national security-related information: (1) tell the rele-
vant inspector general or special counsel per the WPA or (2) disclose to rele-
vant members of Congress per the ICWPA.238 
D. The Official Secrets Act 
The United Kingdom’s Official Secrets Act, first enacted in 1889, crimi-
nalizes the disclosure of certain information by government employees, includ-
ing members of the national security and intelligence agencies, civil servants, 
and members of the armed forces.239 It also regulates the secondary disclosure 
of such information by anyone else.240 The Act differentiates among the penal-
ties various groups face and spells out the available defenses to civil servants 
who engage in such disclosure.241 
The Act has been amended multiple times since 1889, most recently in 
1989.242 The latest version narrowed the types of information, disclosure of 
which was subject to criminal penalties, from a catchall to six specific catego-
ries.243 For each category of information there is a specific test of harm, which 
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the prosecution must prove in order to convict.244 The 1989 Act also removed 
the public interest defense provided for in earlier versions.245 
For members of the security and intelligence services, however, the fact 
of disclosure itself is an “absolute” offense.246 As a result, they are exempted 
from the damages test.247 The only available statutory defense for such em-
ployees is lack of knowledge or lack of reasonable cause to believe that the 
information disclosed related to security or intelligence.248 For all employees, 
the maximum penalty following a conviction is two years imprisonment, an 
unlimited fine, or both.249 
1. Damage Tests 
Section 1 pertains to information relating to security or intelligence.250 
For members of those respective agencies, unauthorized disclosures are subject 
to penalty irrespective of whether or not the disclosure is damaging.251 There is 
no public interest defense and it does not matter whether the disclosed infor-
mation is classified or accurate.252 
For all other government employees and contractors who disclose such 
information, the prosecution must prove that the leak was “damaging.”253 The 
Act defines “damaging” as causing or likely to cause damage to the work of 
the security and intelligence services.254 Information may also be considered 
damaging, even if it is not actually damaging, if it “falls within a class or de-
scription of information,” which the government has previously determined 
“would be likely to have that effect.”255 
Disclosure of the second category of information, that relating to defense, 
is penalized if damaging.256 Damaging is defined as causing actual damage or 
“likely to damage the capability of the armed forces to conduct their tasks, 
leads to a loss of life or injury of those forces or to serious damage to the 
equipment of those forces, endangers the interests of the United Kingdom or 
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endangers the safety of British citizens abroad.”257 Whether or not the infor-
mation is classified is irrelevant.258 
The Act prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of any information “relat-
ing to international relations,” the third category of information relevant to this 
Note. 259 A disclosure of such information is “damaging” if it does or is likely 
to endanger “the interests of the United Kingdom abroad, seriously [obstruct] 
the promotion or protection of the United Kingdom of those interests or [en-
danger] the safety of British citizens abroad.”260 If the information is deemed 
confidential and acquired from a foreign state or international organization, the 
fact of disclosure itself is sufficient to meet the damaging test.261 
For civil servants, the statute allows for a defense of lack of knowledge or 
lack of reasonable cause to believe that the disclosure would have a damaging 
impact for the above-mentioned types of information.262 
2. Whistleblower Protections 
The Public Interest Disclosure Act came into force in July 1999.263 Under 
the Act, workers may raise concerns under certain circumstances, such as dam-
age to the environment or a criminal offense, by bringing their concern before 
an employment tribunal.264 The legislation covers workers in the private and 
public sectors but Section 11 excludes those disclosures that constitute an of-
fense under the Official Secrets Act.265 
III. ANALYSIS 
Conventional wisdom in the United States is that the Official Secrets Act, 
which prohibits all disclosure of certain information, whether by a government 
employee or third party, is antithetical to First Amendment guarantees and the 
tradition of a free press.266 A comparison of the Espionage Act and the Official 
Secrets Act, however, reveals that the differences between the two are nowhere 
near as great as typically presumed and, in fact, may be beginning to con-
verge.267 
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A. The Scope of the Statute 
The Espionage Act is far from a paradigm of clarity.268 Indeed, scholars 
have described it as “incomprehensible if read according to the conventions of 
legal analysis of text, while paying fair attention to legislative history.”269 One 
problem that arises out of this confusion is to whom exactly the Espionage Act 
applies.270 The plain meaning of the Espionage Act appears to apply to anyone, 
government employees and members of the press alike, in the same way the 
Official Secrets Act does.271 In particular, Section 793(e) prohibits the willful 
communication of confidential information by someone who is not authorized 
to possess it.272 From the point of view of the press, because Section 793(e) 
does not have a specific intent requirement, scholars have described it as “pret-
ty much one of the scariest statutes around.”273 
The plain meaning conflicts with a general understanding of the Espionage 
Act, which is that it does not apply to publishers.274 Legislative history appears 
to support that view given Congress’s First Amendment concerns in discussions 
leading up to the Act’s passage, as well as specific rejections of proposals to au-
thorize the executive branch to limit publication of certain topics.275 The Su-
preme Court has not addressed the specific question as to whether publishers can 
be held liable under the Espionage Act and as scholars point out, although the 
Act is widely interpreted as not applying to members of the media, the language 
of the Act does not explicitly guarantee such protections.276 
B. Information Covered 
Both laws prohibit the disclosure of a wide swath of information.277 The 
Espionage Act applies to information “relating to the national defense.”278 The 
term, which was left undefined in the statute, has been given a broad definition 
by courts.279 In the seminal case on the matter, Gorin v. United States, the Su-
preme Court held that national defense “is a generic concept of broad connota-
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tions, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activi-
ties of national preparedness.”280 
In contrast to the increasing breadth of the Espionage Act, the information 
covered by the Official Secrets Act was substantially narrowed in the 1989 
version.281 Indeed, Parliament’s specific intention in passing the 1989 Official 
Secrets Act was to limit those areas in which it would be a crime to leak offi-
cial information.282 Prior to 1989, the disclosure of all “official information” 
was criminalized.283 Now, leaking “official information” is only penalized if 
the information falls into one of six categories.284 As the Home Secretary stat-
ed: 
[T]he criminal law should be prised away from the great bulk of offi-
cial information . . . . [I]t should be used to protect unauthorised dis-
closure of six limited areas . . . . We mean that the criminal law should 
protect, and protect effectively, information whose disclosure is likely 
to cause serious harm to the public interest, and no other.285 
C. Elements of the Crime 
Under the Official Secrets Act, a defendant is guilty if the disclosure was 
“damaging.”286 For a disclosure to be damaging it must be actually or poten-
tially damaging to the national interest in the particular way specified by the 
Act for the relevant category of information.287 Legislative history of the 1989 
version of the Act specifically states that in narrowing the categories of infor-
mation subject to criminal penalties, Parliament wanted to limit sanctions to 
revelations that were in fact actually damaging or likely to be so and to remove 
from sanctions information that was merely embarrassing.288 
The Official Secrets Act expressly relieves the government of the burden 
of proving that national security-related disclosures were “damaging.”289 Alt-
hough the Espionage Act does not provide such an explicit directive, the courts 
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have effectively released the United States government from such a burden.290 
For example, in United States v. Kiriakou, the court explained, “[C]ourts have 
relied on the classified status of information to determine whether it is closely 
held by the government and harmful to the United States.”291 Likewise, in the 
case against Stephen Kim, the court agreed that the fact that information was 
classified meant it was already determined that its release would be damaging, 
so there was nothing left for the government to prove on this point.292 Fur-
thermore, courts have found further support in the non-disclosure agreement 
federal employees typically must sign, the language of which tracks the Espio-
nage Act’s harm element.293 Given the rampant classification and the fact that 
misclassification is not a permissible defense, the practical effect in the United 
States is that prosecutors, like their counterparts in the United Kingdom, do not 
have to prove damage or its potential when it comes to national security-
related disclosures.294 
D. Defenses and Whistleblower Protections 
Both the Espionage Act and the Official Secrets Act prohibit a public in-
terest defense.295 In fact, the public interest defense was specifically removed 
in the passage of the 1989 Official Secrets Act.296 In addition, both laws pro-
hibit a defense of misclassification.297 
Concerning whistleblower protections, laws in both countries are weak 
when it comes to employees who disclose classified information.298 In the Unit-
ed Kingdom, all disclosures that come under the purview of the Official Secrets 
Act are exempt from whistleblower protection.299 The same holds true for secu-
rity and intelligence-related information in the United States.300 Indeed as schol-
ars have observed, whistleblower laws in the United States are “fairly read” to 
provide “absolutely zero protection” for those who publicly reveal classified in-
formation, even as a last resort and even when the information reveals illegal 
government conduct.301 
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CONCLUSION 
In the United States, the practice of leaking is not only common and 
longstanding but also widely understood to be vital to the press’s ability to 
check government secrecy.  Accordingly, Congress has repeatedly refused to 
enact an American version of the Official Secrets Act on the grounds that such 
a law would be repugnant to the laws and culture of the United States.  A care-
ful analysis of the text of the Espionage Act, however, reveals that the vaguely 
worded statute actually permits the regulation of leaks in a manner more simi-
lar to the Official Secrets Act than typically thought. The number of prosecu-
tions under the Espionage Act in the past decade is unprecedented. The gov-
ernment, in seeking to curb leaking, has employed prosecutorial techniques 
that more closely resemble those traditionally used by U.K.—not U.S.—
prosecutors, such as the subpoenaing of journalist records. The United States, 
however, has recently begun to shy away from such aggressive tactics.  What 
impact this will have on future whistleblowers’ willingness to come forward 
remains to be seen. Journalists in Washington, D.C. have reported a chilling of 
relations with sources, but the Department of Justice’s updated policies may 
prove to have a thawing effect. 
 
  
 
 
